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A NEW PHASE IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: 
EXPEDIENCY AND AKP SURVIVAL
Katerina Dalacoura1
The forced departure of Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in May 2016 and the attempted coup d’état 
of July 2016 against the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Turkey were both 
turning points and catalysts for a new phase in the country’s foreign policy. The emphasis on the 
“civilizational” aspects of Turkey’s role in foreign affairs is diminishing and there is a concomitant 
move away from the ambitious promotion of Turkey as a “great power”. In its place, we can 
observe a more “transactional”, unplanned, ad hoc type of foreign policy, based on expediency. The 
ideological preferences of the AKP government are still significant but, as Turkey descends into 
internal crisis, and the Syrian war continues to take its toll, the interests and survival of the ruling 
party are increasingly paramount. This will have important and possibly harmful implications for 
the manner in which Turkey’s national interests are conceptualized and pursued abroad, and will 
shape Turkey’s role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
THE TURNING POINT OF DAVUTOĞLU’S RESIGNATION
Ahmet Davutoğlu was forced to resign from the position of prime minister in May 2016. He had 
been the guru of the AKP’s foreign policy during his tenure as chief foreign policy adviser to Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2003-09) and then foreign minister (2009-14). An academic-cum-
politician, Davutoğlu’s writings became the foundation for a reorientation in Turkey’s foreign policy. 
His fundamental thesis was that, were Turkey truer to its “civilizational self” (which in his mind 
entailed being more open to its Islamic and Ottoman past), it would be a stronger country overall 
and more powerful in the international arena. Davutoğlu argued against the idea of a “clash of 
civilizations” – his view was that Turkey could have good relations with both the East and the West 
– but he believed, nevertheless, that civilizations had an “essence” and an important role to play 
in world politics.
The AKP, in power since 2002, has not altered the fundamentals of Turkey’s foreign policy: Turkey’s 
membership of NATO remains its central pillar, and its commitment to gaining EU membership 
still stands. An understanding of Turkish nationalism as homogeneous and monolithic continues to 
inform, if not completely dominate, the government’s approach to the Kurdish issue internally and 
externally (more of which below). The AKP has tried to redefine the Turkish national interest and 
Turkish nationalism but, in some ways, it has not eclipsed Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy as 
much as added a new layer to it. This is because foreign policy-making is a complicated business 
which can never be totally dominated by one man, be it Davutoğlu or even his more powerful boss, 
Erdoğan. One could even see Davutoğlu’s “neo-Ottomanism”, as it has been described, as another 
1 Katerina Dalacoura is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at the London School of 
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instrument in Turkey’s power projection. It is not the place here to resolve the perennial dilemmas 
between ideational and material interests in the formation of foreign policy. Suffice it to say that 
ideology was a significant aspect of AKP foreign policy but did not – and could not – constitute its 
entirety.
Be that as it may, with Davutoğlu gone the civilizational discourse in AKP foreign policy has been 
fizzling out. Although this discourse did not necessarily constitute the core of Turkey’s foreign 
policy orientation, its gradual disappearance is emblematic of a new phase. Turkey’s relations with 
Israel and Russia were normalized within two months of Davutoğlu’s resignation. The diplomatic 
repair had already been on the cards, but his departure provided the opportunity for accelerated 
change.
THE IMPACT OF THE ATTEMPTED COUP D’ÉTAT
The domestic implications of the attempted coup against the AKP government in July 2016 are 
profound and ongoing. The coup lacked popularity but the ruling party, and President Erdoğan, 
have used it as an opportunity to further increase their grip on power. The weakening of democratic 
institutions, already evident, has quickened as a result. The coup attempt prompted the initiation of 
purges against its alleged perpetrators, the Gülenist movement, and many other opponents of the 
government. There is currently a push to change the constitution and move from a parliamentarian 
to a presidential system, with a referendum to decide the matter planned to take place on 16 April 
2017. Polarization in the country is deepening.
The conflict with the Gülenist movement, which erupted in 2013, is only one of three in which 
Erdoğan and the AKP are engaged at the time of writing (February 2017), the other two being 
with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and with Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The peace 
process, such as it was, with the country’s Kurdish minority broke down in the summer of 2015 and 
violence has erupted repeatedly since then, with the government taking repressive and destructive 
action in the south-east and the PKK perpetrating terrorist attacks throughout the country. Turkey 
has also been the target of terrorist attacks by ISIS, which has an axe to grind because of Ankara’s 
Syria policy, particularly since the Turkish armed forces began intervening more directly in Syria 
from late August 2016, including targeting ISIS. This three-way struggle has shaped Turkey’s 
domestic politics, but it is now also informing foreign policy, which is entering a new phase.
A SHIFT TO EXPEDIENCY IN FOREIGN POLICY
The AKP government is increasingly under siege, and this has led it to seek support abroad 
whenever and from whomever it can find it. Its rapprochement with Russia indicates that it is 
ready to put principles aside, most probably recognizing that the goal of removing Assad has failed 
and that its support of the Syrian opposition has not worked. The rapprochement with Israel does 
not necessarily, of course, indicate an abandonment of the Palestinian cause, but it demonstrates 
the need to mend fences with this important power in the region, with which Turkey, moreover, has 
close economic ties. The AKP will continue, with Qatar, to support Muslim Brotherhood movements 
in the Middle East, but it will work towards restoring relations with the Egyptian government of 
Abdel Fatah al Sisi, who removed the Brotherhood from power in 2013. Relations with Saudi Arabia, 
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with whom Ankara has been locked in ideological confrontation (over Brotherhood ideology, which 
Riyadh abhors), have already improved and will continue to do so. Relations with Iran, with whom 
Turkey has traditionally had an effective working relationship despite geopolitical rivalries, will 
carry on as such and this will be an asset both in Syria and in Iraq, where the two countries 
confront aspects of the Kurdish problem. Finally, Turkey may be party to a resolution of the Cyprus 
conflict in the negotiations of 2017.
One could argue that all of the above are positive developments, in that they indicate a shift towards 
a pragmatism which favours Turkey’s national interests and constitute a much needed correction 
to previous AKP foreign policy mistakes, above all the rigid insistence on the removal of Assad. 
They are also part and parcel of a move away from an “emotive” foreign policy, symbolized by the 
breakdown of relations with Assad, Benjamin Netanyahu and Vladimir Putin (over the shooting 
down of a Russian military aeroplane in November 2015). Furthermore, these developments 
do not indicate in themselves a dramatic shift in AKP foreign policy. As I argued above, Turkish 
nationalism and the national interest, as shaped by Kemalist ideology, have not been eclipsed by 
the AKP but have been reconceptualized to a degree by it. This can be seen in the fixation of the 
AKP government on the Kurdish issue as the primary “national” problem of Turkey and the AKP’s 
pursuit of the PKK and its sister organization, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), in Syria.
The Kurdish issue constitutes the main dividing line at present between Turkey and the United 
States, and the West in general. All the parties share a common enemy in ISIS. The problem 
is that, for Turkey, the YPG in Syria is an equally if not more important enemy. US forces have 
sided with and supported the YPG against ISIS, which has created a split between Washington and 
Ankara, though this may be changing now that ISIS is attacking Turkey more venomously, as seen 
in the Reina assault in Istanbul on the first day of 2017.
Therein lies the problem. The conflict with the United States over Syria and the Kurds fits in well 
with the AKP and Erdoğan’s domestic agenda. The July 2016 coup has been blamed, absurdly, 
by Turkish commentators on the United States and the West. The Turkish government has done 
nothing to correct the view of (at some point up to) 70 percent of Turkey’s population that the 
United States was behind the coup. The return to conspiratorial hysteria is an easy option for 
the ruling party in its search for domestic enemies. It is also having a direct effect on relations 
with the United States, even though, for all its toying with Russia, Turkey will not abandon NATO, 
nor will it abandon the formal pursuit of EU membership. But the anti-Western, anti-American 
rhetoric of its government and particularly its president – albeit no longer based on the diminished 
“civilizational” discourse – is in the service of the AKP, not the nation, and illustrates a readiness 
to use foreign policy for narrow political self-interest.
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MENA REGION AND FOR TURKEY-EU RELATIONS
The gradual side-lining of civilizational ideology and discourse, never more than one aspect of 
Turkish foreign policy, is a positive development. It went with the departure of its major architect, 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, and as a result of the Syrian quagmire in which Turkey is caught up. However, 
although the new direction in Turkish foreign policy coincides (for now) with the pragmatic 
assessment of national interests, it is not driven by them; rather, AKP interests are paramount. 
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As Turkey descends into political, institutional and – as of January 2017, with the slide of the 
Turkish lira – economic difficulties and even possibly crises, and the ruling party and its leaders 
increasingly perceive themselves as being under siege and seek to conjure up foreign conspiracies 
against them, they will be ready to act on these perceptions, possibly to the detriment of the 
country. All leaders see their own and their country’s interests as being intertwined to a degree; 
but it is a perilous moment in a country’s history when its leadership comes to believe that they are 
inseparable. Therein lies an important danger for Turkey’s future foreign relations and prospects 
in the international arena.
The implications of this analysis for Turkey’s relations with the EU are multifaceted. If it is, indeed, 
the case that the AKP and President Erdoğan will be immediately concerned with their narrow 
interests as a result of internal pressures and the very precarious regional situation, then relations 
with the EU will be much more transactional. This could lead to greater cooperation in the four 
areas of concern in Turkey-EU relations (accession negotiations, the issue of refugees, Cyprus and 
security cooperation). However, European leaders should also be prepared for decisions by the 
Turkish government that may be detrimental to the long-term interest of the country if short-term 
political advantage is to be gained – the possibility of Turkey obstructing a Cyprus deal being the 
most obvious case in point.
With regard to Turkey’s role in the MENA region, the conclusion from the above analysis is that 
Turkey will be a less involved, less interventionist power than in the immediate post-2011 period. 
It will pursue its immediate interests in Syria and Iraq more purposefully, as it has done over the 
past few months, because this tallies with AKP objectives. However, when it comes to Turkey’s 
role further afield in the MENA, there will be a dissipation of efforts to present the country as a 
regional leader or a model. Support for Muslim Brotherhood groups will continue but in a more 
low-key fashion; growing Turkish cooperation with Saudi Arabia, and the improvement of relations 
with Israel and possibly with Egypt, discussed above, are indications of this shift, which signals a 
less ideological foreign policy. Turkey will continue to pursue its own interests in the MENA region, 
cooperating with the West and the EU at times, and will remain an important regional power, but 
the focus of its government on pressing internal concerns will mean that it will not necessarily 
play an active role in resolving regional issues, or that it will do so only when short-term political 
advantage demands it.
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